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While such free riding might be economically rational according to standard rational choice theory, it is probably a violation of one's moral obligations. The present results thus fit with several other recent findings that suggest that professional ethicists are, on average, no morally better behaved than are socially similar non-ethicists.
In conversation I've heard various arguments for registration skepticism. The two most common are (i.) that registration is not morally required if the registration line is long, and (ii.)
that the APA is unworthy of monetary support. The first argument might be a good argument against the moral duty to register at the beginning of the conference, before one attends one's first session. One might still register mid-conference after the lines have calmed. The second argument might justify declining to pay in excess of what is necessary to host the conference, but in fact the APA's modest registration fees don't even cover the entire cost of the conference (which is subsidized from annual APA membership fees and other sources). It also seems, to me, a suspiciously self-serving form of purism that declines, on moral grounds, to pay participation fees to an imperfect organization and yet does not decline the professional advantages of appearing on the program hosted by that same organization. Doubtless, sophisticated arguments can be mounted on both sides of the question; that's what we philosophers are good at! I don't claim to have closed the issue. Nor would I claim that nonregistration is a grave sin or wrong in all cases. Furthermore, even if registration is in general not morally preferable to non-registration, the empirical results might still be interesting. For example, the results might be interpreted as revealing that ethicists are no better than nonethicists at detecting the non-obligation to register.
It is also sometimes suggested to me in conversation that professional ethicists should not be expected to behave any differently than anyone else -that their job is only to theorize about
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April 10, 2012 Ethicists' Registration, p. 14 morality, not to live it. This has always seemed to me an odd view. Carried to its logical conclusion, it seems to imply that we should expect ethicists who advocate vegetarianism, such as Peter Singer (1975 Singer ( /2002 , to eat cheeseburgers at the same rate as everyone else. The conflict between advocating vegetarianism in print and consuming large amounts of meat in person seems sharper than does the conflict between lecturing on the need to act on universalizable maxims, or on the virtues of honesty and generosity, or on how to support a well-functioning society, and sneaking past the registration line to do so. But one might have thought that in a substantial range of cases there would be some conflict, some felt pressure of irony. As far as I can see, though, any conflict either isn't felt keenly enough to influence behavior or is masked by other influences.
